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Abstract 
Because Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) contracts take land out of production for at least 
ten years, when deciding to enroll a parcel of land, a landowner must weigh the opportunity costs 
of hindering production flexibility against a guaranteed constant annual return. This thesis 
discusses whether having a CRP contract on a parcel of land in any way effects the value of that 
parcel. This is accomplished through the use of a hedonic model using data from 1998-2014 on 
Kansas agricultural land transactions. Results show that unlike in previous literature, while the 
effect of CRP is typically negative, it can become positive depending on the state of market 
factors at the time of the transaction. 
 
 
iv 
 
Table of Contents 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................. v 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. vi 
Chapter 1 - Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Objective & Motivation .................................................................................................... 2 
Chapter 2 - Literature Review ......................................................................................................... 4 
2.1 CRP and the Behavior of Landowners .............................................................................. 4 
2.2 The Application of Hedonic Models ................................................................................. 4 
Chapter 3 - Model ........................................................................................................................... 7 
3.1 An Explanation of CRP Opportunity Cost ........................................................................ 7 
3.2 Basic Hedonic Model ...................................................................................................... 12 
Chapter 4 - Data ............................................................................................................................ 15 
4.1 KSFMRA ........................................................................................................................ 15 
4.2 KFMA Data .................................................................................................................... 18 
4.3 Data Summary ................................................................................................................ 18 
Chapter 5 - Results ........................................................................................................................ 25 
Chapter 6 - Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 37 
6.1 Empirical Findings .......................................................................................................... 37 
6.2 Policy Implications ......................................................................................................... 37 
6.3 Future Research .............................................................................................................. 39 
References ..................................................................................................................................... 41 
Appendix A - Results for All Kansas Regions ............................................................................. 43 
Northwest Kansas ................................................................................................................. 43 
North Central Kansas ............................................................................................................ 44 
Northeast Kansas .................................................................................................................. 46 
Southwest Kansas ................................................................................................................. 47 
South Central Kansas ............................................................................................................ 49 
Southeast Kansas .................................................................................................................. 50 
  
v 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 3.1 Average CRP vs. Cash Rent-to-Value Ratios, 1995-2014 ............................................ 9 
Figure 3.2 Average CRP vs. Cash Rent-to-Value Ratios, Northwest Kansas .............................. 11 
Figure 3.3 Average CRP vs. Cash Rent-to-Value Ratios, Northeast Kansas ............................... 11 
Figure 4.1 Net Returns to Corn, Wheat, Soybeans, and Grain Sorghum Enterprises in KS ........ 16 
Figure 4.2 Dryland Operation Net Income, 1998-2014 ................................................................ 16 
Figure 5.1 Linear Combinations of CRP Coefficient and Interaction Terms, Northwest KS ...... 29 
Figure 5.2 Linear Combinations of CRP Coefficient and Interaction Terms, Northeast KS ....... 31 
Figure 5.3 Average CRP Rental Rate in Northwest Kansas, 1995-2014...................................... 34 
Figure 5.4 Average CRP Enrollment in Kansas by Region .......................................................... 36 
 
  
vi 
 
List of Tables 
Table 4.4.1 Summary Statistics for Basic Hedonic Model ........................................................... 19 
Table 5.1 Hedonic Model Regression Results .............................................................................. 26 
Table 5.2 Total Effect of CRP on Land Value by Year, Northwest Kansas ................................. 29 
Table 5.3 Total Effect of CRP on Land Value by Year, Northeast Kansas .................................. 31 
1 
 
 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 1.1 Introduction 
The Conservation Reserve Program was implemented by Congress as part of the Food 
Security Act of 1985. This program provides government funds to reimburse producers who 
choose to pull their most environmentally impactful land out of production. This land, which 
must have been planted to regular crops for 4 of the past 6 years, is then reverted back to natural 
cover in an effort to “control soil erosion, improve water and air quality, and enhance wildlife 
habitat” (USDA, 2008). Producers enter into contracts that last 10 to 15 years that ensure the 
government will pay them for this land should they continue to leave it dormant. The amount 
received by the producer is determined by a competitive bid system and is fixed over the life of 
the contract. A producer can offer as many acres as they want at up to maximum bid prices 
established by the government. Because this system is competitive, the lower the price offered by 
the producer, the greater the chance of the bid’s acceptance. Acceptance of the bid is based on an 
environmental benefits index (EBI) which is a formula written and tabulated by the USDA. The 
higher a parcel of land’s EBI, the more likely it is to be accepted. The criteria included in the 
EBI range from potential wildlife and native plant species benefits, to air and water quality 
concerns, to water and wind erosion potential of the parcel in question As of October 2015, CRP 
enrollment included 23.36 million acres, of which 2.11 million acres were located in Kansas. 
Kansas is second only to Texas in total acres currently enrolled in the Conservation Reserve 
Program. 
While this program’s continued existence proves its popularity, the fact remains that 
many still find fault with this program. The most pressing stems from the lengths of the contracts 
2 
 
offered. When conservation first began in earnest in the US with the 1954 Farm Bill, producers 
could enter similar conservation programs for as few as three years. However, the USDA felt 
that a longer contract would allow the natural cover more time to grow and provide more 
environmental benefits. Therefore, in 1985, the 10 and 15 year contracts were established. Some 
praise this change as it provides a constant source of income for producers, especially when farm 
incomes are low. These payments represent a guaranteed stream of revenue for at least the length 
of the contract. However, as has been well documented over the past decade, crop prices and 
farm incomes are volatile. Therefore, when prices rise, producers who have CRP contracts on 
their land do not have the flexibility to plant what they want when they want. Because of this 
restriction, the question remains as to what effect the perceived opportunity cost of owning a 
parcel of land with a CRP contract has on land value. 
 1.2 Objective & Motivation  
The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) has been a source of controversy since its 
implementation. While most believe the program has had positive environmental benefits, some 
question the economic methods used to obtain these results. CRP contracts require producers to 
take land out of production and revert that land to natural cover. In return, the government 
provides annual payments to the producer. These contracts last from 10 to 15 years and in order 
to opt out, producers face substantial fines. Therefore, when applying for a CRP contract, a 
producer must weigh the benefits of having a constant stream of revenue over at least the next 
decade with the flexibility forfeited by taking the given land out of production. However, the 
question remains if there are any unforeseen consequences that agreeing to a CRP contract can 
present, especially when it comes to selling land that holds a contracted designation. Will 
potential buyers prefer to receive the constant stream of payments? Or would they rather 
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purchase land that allows for complete flexibility? From 1998 to 2014, the average CRP payment 
to Kansas landowners was just under $40 per acre. Therefore, if the profit potential of land 
enrolled in CRP is greater than that figure, then the presence of the CRP contract has the 
potential to decrease the sale price if this parcel is sold. However, if potential profitability is 
below that figure, the land under contract may actually be worth more in the market than land not 
under contract.  
Previous research has attempted to quantify the effect of CRP contracts on land sales, but 
only over relatively short periods of time and not for Kansas. Therefore, the objective of this 
research is to utilize parcel-level land sales data in the state of Kansas and determine whether or 
not the presence of a CRP contract on a parcel of land affects the sale value of that land and how 
that impact changes over time. The analysis is conducted over times of both exceptional and 
average profitability in the farming sector (1998-2014), allowing measurement of any changes in 
land buyers’ valuation of the opportunity cost associated with CRP contracts. A cross-section of 
Kansas land sales data observed over 17 years which includes descriptions of land parcels 
including location, productivity, accessibility, and the presence or absence of a CRP contract, is 
used to estimate land values. A hedonic model regression is employed to allow for the estimate 
of the demand for certain land traits and characteristics. It will be shown that the presence of a 
CRP contract can have a positive or negative effect on land values, depending on the profitability 
of the Kansas agricultural sector relative to the payments received under a CRP contract.  
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
 2.1 CRP and the Behavior of Landowners 
In 1989, four years after the implementation of CRP, Shoemaker published an article that 
argued that in a time of declining land prices, CRP was actually driving up the value of eligible 
lands. His argument focused on the frequency of sign-ups for CRP and the readily available 
nature of the maximum bids the government was willing to accept. He found that producers 
could wait until later sign-ups and receive higher premiums for lower quality of land because of 
the government mandate to enroll 40 million acres. Therefore, CRP could be shown to have a 
positive effect on national land values. 
Similarly, Kirwan, Lubowski, and Roberts (2005) analyzed sign-ups for CRP from 1997 
to 2003. They focused on the environmental benefits index (EBI) which the USDA uses to 
determine whether or not to accept a bid. It was shown that those producers who knew they had 
land that was more beneficial to the program and had higher EBI values were likely to ask for 
more money to retire that land through CRP. Additionally, this study showed it was possible for 
producers to receive a windfall for their enrolled land, thereby again increasing the value for 
CRP land on the whole. 
 2.2 The Application of Hedonic Models 
While the above studies are important, their employed methods did not consider the 
potential for the value of the CRP contract to change in relation to the forgone option of farming 
that land. One way to analyze the impact of a specific characteristics of land (with or without a 
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current CRP contract) on overall land value is to employ the hedonic pricing model originally 
put forward by Rosen (1974).  
Taff and Weisberg (2007) estimated a hedonic model using observations of farm sales 
with CRP contracts in Minnesota from 2002 to 2004. They implemented six different hedonic 
models with slightly varying data sets. Each data set used the log of price per acre as the 
dependent variable, but included or modified certain variables to compare the effects of certain 
traits. They found a reduction in price per acre was 8% to 15% when a CRP contract was in place 
for a given parcel. Taff and Weisberg concluded that their analysis suggests appraisers should 
both consider the effect of CRP when appraising land under contract and ensure that sellers of 
similar, non-contracted parcels are not being harmed by comparisons of CRP-contracted lands to 
their own. 
A similar analysis was conducted on agricultural land in North Dakota from 2000 to 2004 
(Schmitz and Shultz, 2008). However, for this analysis, CRP sales data was not immediately 
available. Instead, Schmitz and Schultz used geographic information systems (GIS) data of 33 
state-held and maintained sites known to be under CRP contracts to establish criteria that would 
allow for similar parcels of land to be declared CRP sales. Sales of 98 parcels were found to have 
met the established criteria. Again, a hedonic model was employed using a binary variable for 
the presence of CRP land. Also included were binary variables for year and region, as well as 
continuous variables for log of parcel size, distance to an interstate, spring wheat yield, and the 
percentage of wetland which was also gleaned from GIS data. The results of this analysis found 
that a CRP contract decreased the value of a parcel of land by 13.8% relative to parcels with no 
CRP contract. 
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The hedonic model specifications found in previous studies provide a roadmap for the 
current analysis. Although the variable of interest is the presence of a CRP contract, other parcel-
specific parameters must be included in the model to control for the heterogeneity of land and its 
impact on sales prices. Land characteristics shown to be statistically significant in hedonic 
models of agricultural land values include parcel size, timing of the sale, parcel location, and 
land quality. This variable is especially important due to the fact that the CRP program is 
designed to set aside land that is environmentally sensitive. This often includes highly erodible 
land, which would have a lower productivity rating and, thus, a lower value.  Schmitz and Shultz 
used spring wheat yield to measure quality, while Taff and Weisberg used a University of 
Minnesota productivity index to rate the quality of land. In this study, a rating of quality is made 
by professional land appraisers and recorded in the sale data. One drawback of the existing 
literature addressing the impact of CRP contracts on land values is that it is constrained to a 
limited number of states and relatively short observational time periods. Given the relatively 
large number of CRP acres in Kansas and the availability of a dataset containing seventeen years 
of land sales, this research makes a notable contribution to the literature.  
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Chapter 3 - Model 
 3.1 An Explanation of CRP Opportunity Cost 
In its simplest form, the decision to enroll a parcel of land in the Conservation Reserve 
Program is driven by a comparison of the present value of payments received over the life of the 
contract defined as 
(1) 𝑉0
𝐶 = ∑ 𝐶𝑡/(1 + 𝑟𝑡)
𝑡𝑘
𝑡=1  
where 𝑉0
𝐶 is the value of land in at the end of period 0; 𝐶𝑡 is the rent received from the CRP 
program at the end of period t; k is equal to either 10 years or 15 years, depending on the contract 
length; and 𝑟𝑡 is the constant real discount rate for year t. Similarly, the present value of farming 
the land can be represented as follows 
(2)  𝑉0
𝐹 = ∑ 𝐹𝑡/(1 + 𝑟𝑡)
𝑡𝑘
𝑡=1  
where 𝑉0
𝐹is the value of the land at the end of period 0; 𝐹𝑡 is the annual cash rent received from 
the land being farmed; and all other variables are as defined previously. If the present value of 
returns from CRP, 𝑉0
𝐶, is greater than the present value of cash rents received from farming the 
land, 𝑉0
𝐹, over the same time horizon, then the landowner will prefer a CRP contract. In this 
context, the opportunity cost is defined as 
 (3)  𝑉0
𝐶 − 𝑉0
𝐹. 
 In addition to considering the monetary returns from a CRP contract as compared to 
farming the land, non-pecuniary benefits may accrue to the landowner from enrolling the land in 
CRP. For example, if the landowner places a high value on providing habitat for wildlife or 
slowing the erosion of soils from their land, then having a CRP contract may be even more 
attractive to a landowner. These non-pecuniary benefits are not observable, but may affect 
individual landowner’s decisions to participate in the program. 
8 
 
Another factor that affects the present value comparison is the impact on the productivity 
of the land parcel when it exits the CRP contract and farming is resumed. Land which has lain 
dormant for at least a decade might require an adjustment period to again reach its full yield 
potential based on a number of factors. This land has not been tilled, fertilized, or managed in a 
farming capacity over a long period of time. Therefore, entering into a CRP contract can 
potentially have an impact on returns to farming beyond the span of the contract itself. Again, 
these impacts are not easily observable and are likely to differ by both soil characteristics and 
farm management practices.  
While the payments received from a CRP contract do not vary over the life of the 
contract, returns from farm will fluctuate with the profitability of the crop sector. Landowners 
cannot know what commodity prices or costs of production will be and, therefore, there 
assessment of the present value is based on imperfect information. When deciding to enroll, a 
landowner only knows recent profit levels for farming and cannot foresee the micro and 
macroeconomic drivers that will change the returns of farming a parcel of land over a multiple-
year horizon.  
The opportunity cost of a CRP contract relative to farming is unique to each landowner 
and parcel. A proxy for this tradeoff for the state of Kansas would be a comparison of the annual 
state average CRP rental rate to the annual state average cash rent from non-irrigated farming. To 
normalize these rents relative to land values, the rent-to-value ratio is calculated. This ratio also 
reflects the average returns to ownership of land when it is either enrolled in CRP or farmed. 
Figure 3.1 shows the rent-to-value ratio of both cash rents and CRP rental payments over the 
time period 1995 to 2014. The rent-to-value was calculated for farming using non-irrigated 
cropland cash rental rates for Kansas (USDA-NASS, 2016). The rent-to-value calculations for 
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land enrolled in CRP were obtained using state-level average rents paid on all CRP contracts 
gathered from the Farm Service Agency (USDA-FSA, 2016). Land values were calculated using 
averages of the sales data for each year. The years 1995 to 1997 were not included in the dataset, 
so land values for those years were collected from USDA-NASS and used for both the CRP and 
farming rent-to-value calculations (USDA-NASS).  
Figure 3.1 Average CRP vs. Cash Rent-to-Value Ratios, 1995-2014 
Source: USDA NASS, USDA FSA 
 From 1995-2009, the average returns to land under CRP contract were higher than the 
average returns to farming. The difference between the rent-to-value ratios was greatest in the 
years 1995 to 1997, averaging 3.2% higher returns than farming. In 1998, the differential 
dropped to 1.3% and remained at a higher level through 2009.  
Given the high returns to CRP contracts relative to the average returns to farming, it 
seems reasonable to ask why every landowner did not enroll their land into a CRP contract. The 
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rules of the program ensure that mass enrollments are not possible. Along with the acreage cap, 
the bidding process is complex and favors land that, when retired, would bring about the most 
positive environmental impact. Also, the above trend reflects returns to farming for the average 
piece of land. If the land or the farmer’s management skills are greater than average, it is quite 
possible that farming the land is still the economically preferential option. 
 According to figure 3.1, 2010 marks a shift in the relative returns to CRP over farming. 
High commodity prices and record farm incomes resulted in average cash rents that made 
farming the more profitable choice. If given the choice, it seems plausible that landowners would 
consider breaking their CRP contract and resume farming the land. However, this option would 
result in having to repay the entire amount the government has paid on the contract up to that 
point in time. Also, management costs associated with cash rentals tend to be higher than those 
associated with CRP. A landowner has to exert the effort to either find a tenant or farm the land 
themselves and this may require investment in machinery and other management costs. Finally, 
the previously mentioned nonpecuniary benefits of the program may be large enough that they 
are willing to accept a lower rate of return to avoid losing the environmental benefits associated 
with the CRP contract. 
 While figure 3.1 shows how the CRP and cash rent to value ratios changed on average 
statewide, it is also important to consider the lack of homogeneity in Kansas agricultural land. 
Each region has a distinct crop mix that can be attributed to its unique land characteristics. 
Parcels of land in Eastern Kansas tend to be better for crops like corn and soybeans, while 
Western Kansas favors wheat and fallow. With this in mind, figure 3.2 and 3.3 were constructed. 
They show the CRP and cash rent to value ratios for the Northwest Kansas Farm Management 
Association (KFMA) region and the Northeast KFMA region. These charts were constructed 
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using a weighted average by county enrollment of CRP rate (USDA-FSA, 2016) and regional 
land values in Kansas. 
Figure 3.2 Average CRP vs. Cash Rent-to-Value Ratios, Northwest Kansas 
 
Figure 3.3 Average CRP vs. Cash Rent-to-Value Ratios, Northeast Kansas 
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 These figures clearly illustrate that there are potential regional differences in how CRP is 
valued. In Northwest Kansas, only the first three years shown in the figure (1995-1997) have a 
higher rent to value ratio for CRP, while during the remainder of the period observed farming 
has a higher rate of return than CRP enrollment. However, in Northwest Kansas, acres enrolled 
in CRP always have a higher rent to value ratio than farming, even during the high profitability 
period between 2011 and 2013. Therefore, it is crucial that the model account for these potential 
regional differences. 
 The decision to enroll in CRP is a long term one of which there is no way of accurately 
predicting the economic outcome. It is logical that the initial opportunity cost that a landowner 
takes on will change over the life of the CRP contract. It is the assertion of this analysis that 
these opportunity cost shifts will then be reflected in potential land buyer’s willingness to pay for 
parcels with CRP contracts. 
 3.2 Basic Hedonic Model 
Hedonic models have been used for decades with the first widely accepted theoretical 
model published by Rosen in 1974. This model dealt with a differentiated product and its 
demand. The application of models to land values soon followed and is highlighted by 
Palmquist’s extension of Rosen’s work (1989). Palmquist stated that a general hedonic model for 
land prices would consider the impact of land characteristics, 𝑥𝑖 on the price of a parcel of 
land 𝑃(𝑥), such that: 
( 4 )  𝑷(𝑿) = 𝑷(𝒙𝟏, 𝒙𝟐, … , 𝒙𝒏) 
For this analysis, multiple OLS regression was used to create a hedonic model of land 
values using transaction-level land sales data. Hedonic models attempt to analyze many potential 
valuation factors in an effort to show what traits possessed by a parcel of land will increase or 
decrease the value of that parcel. This also allows for direct comparisons between different 
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variables of the same type; for instance good vs. average vs. poor quality land or hard road vs. 
gravel road vs. dirt road. By using the log of price per acre as the dependent variable, it is 
possible to interpret the value of the output coefficient measures as percent changes in the price 
per acre given the implied condition. The initial model employed is as follows: 
( 5 ) ln(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖) = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖
2 + 𝛽3𝑁𝐼𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑟𝑟𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑖 +  𝛽5𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 +
𝛽6𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽8𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐴𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 +  𝛽11 ln(𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑡) + 𝛽10𝐶𝑅𝑃𝑖 +
 S(𝑌) +  I(𝐶𝑅𝑃𝑖 ∗ 𝑌) + J(𝐶𝑅𝑃𝑖 ∗ 𝐾𝐹𝑀𝐴) + R𝑄 +  Z𝐶 +  𝜀𝑖 
where 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 and 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖
2 are the linear and quadratic terms for size in acres of a given parcel i, 
𝑁𝐼𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑖 is the percent of parcel i that is classified as cropland, 𝐼𝑟𝑟𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑖 is the percent of parcel 
i that is irrigated, 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 and 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑖 are dummy variables indicating average or good land 
quality, respectively, of parcel i, 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑖 and 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖 are binary variables that indicate the type of 
road that accesses parcel i, 𝐴𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 is a binary variable indicating if parcel i sold at a public 
auction,   𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑡 represents the lagged regional net returns to management per acre, 𝐶𝑅𝑃𝑖 is a 
binary variable indicating if a CRP contract is present on parcel i,  𝑌 is a vector of binary 
variables indicating the sale year, 𝐶𝑅𝑃𝑖 ∗ 𝑌 is a vector of interaction terms between sale year and 
𝐶𝑅𝑃𝑖, 𝐶𝑅𝑃𝑖 ∗ 𝐾𝐹𝑀𝐴 is a vector of interaction terms between a binary variable indicating the 
KFMA region and 𝐶𝑅𝑃𝑖, 𝑄 is a vector of binary variables indicating the quarter of the year when 
the parcel sold, and 𝐶 is a vector of binary variables indicating the county in which the parcel is 
located. 
 The variables of most interest in this research are 𝐶𝑅𝑃𝑖 and 𝐶𝑅𝑃𝑖 ∗ 𝑌. The coefficient of 
𝐶𝑅𝑃𝑖 will represent the change in price per acre of a parcel of land whether a CRP contract is 
present or not in the first year of the research. The interaction terms allow for this coefficient to 
change over the time period and give a measure of how CRP contracts are valued in different 
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years. This, something that has been absent from previous literature, can help quantify the shifts 
in opportunity cost over the life a CRP contract. Additionally, the inclusion of interaction terms 
between 𝐶𝑅𝑃𝑖 and KFMA region will account for potential differences in regional planting 
patterns and crop mixes. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the shifts in this opportunity cost 
should be reflected in the willingness of potential buyers to pay for parcels of land that have a 
CRP contract on them.  
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Chapter 4 - Data 
In order to investigate the question of interest, data were obtained on transaction-level 
land sales throughout the state of Kansas from 1998-2014. This allows for the analysis to include 
times of both ordinary and extraordinary profitability in the agricultural sector. 
 4.1 KSFMRA 
Parcel level land sales data were obtained from the Kansas Society of Farm Managers 
and Rural Appraisers’ (KSFMRA) annual sales records (KSFMRA, 2016). This organization 
tracks all agricultural land sales in the state of Kansas during each calendar year. In order to 
ensure that periods of both extraordinary and normal returns to farming were included in this 
analyses, it was decided that the records dating from 1998 to 2014 would be used. Figure 4.1 
shows the net returns to management of the four main crop enterprises in the state of Kansas 
over the given time period. Figure 4.2 shows the dryland operation net income over the same 
time period. These figures illustrate that returns and incomes varied greatly over the chosen 
years, and therefore the potential effect of CRP contracts on land sales could be observed in 
many economic environments.  
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Figure 4.1 Net Returns to Corn, Wheat, Soybeans, and Grain Sorghum Enterprises in KS 
Source: Kansas Farm Management Association 
Figure 4.2 Dryland Operation Net Income, 1998-2014 
Source: Kansas Farm Management Association 
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 Once the year range was selected, the data collection process began. Each year had a 
specific set of variables that were deemed pertinent to this analysis. Crucial initial variables 
included: county of sale, month of sale, location of sale, total acres, total price, price per acre, 
whether the road leading to the parcel was dirt, gravel, or hard paved, whether the land was 
assessed as low quality, average quality, or high quality, the number of cropland acres, the 
number of irrigated acres, and a section titled “Other Factors Affecting Value (Comments on 
minerals, improvements, conservation, and other factors)”. It was in this last section where 
assessors and appraisers were encouraged to make notes about the CRP program and whether or 
not a given parcel of land had any CRP contracts upon it. As this section did not have clear 
instructions, the quality of information therein varied greatly. Some appraisers went so far as to 
include the number of acres of the parcel enrolled in CRP, the rate at which the acres were 
enrolled, as well as the date the contract would expire. Still others simply wrote “CRP” with no 
distinguishing details. In order to extract these instances of CRP on a parcel, an Excel “if” query, 
resulting in a 1 for yes or a 0 for no, was created to show if CRP was mentioned in the comment 
section. Each positive return was checked to ensure that the parcel was still indeed under contract 
when the note was made and the note was not referring to “expired” or “retired” CRP land. Then, 
when additional information such as number of acres enrolled, CRP rate, or CRP expiration date 
were present, those too were extracted and placed in a separate Excel column as a new variable. 
This process led to the binary variable for 𝐶𝑅𝑃𝑖 which is included in this analysis. 
 In addition to the 𝐶𝑅𝑃𝑖 variable, other important variables were constructed. Also found 
in the comments was whether a parcel was sold in a public forum such as an auction or whether 
it was sold privately. The sale of land via a public auction was also turned into a binary variable 
and included in the model. Some years used county name and some years used an alphabetical 
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list of counties and their corresponding numbers to denote the sale location. These were all 
normalized to the binary matrix of counties included in the model. Additionally, a regional 
variable was constructed based on the counties found in the six KFMA regions. A quarter binary 
variable was also constructed based on the month data included in the original KSFMRA data 
sets. The cropland acre and irrigated acre numbers were divided by total acres and rendered as 
percentages for each parcel as well. Binary variables were constructed for access road type and 
land quality. 
 4.2 KFMA Data 
In an effort to include a measure of market factors, a net returns variable was constructed. 
This variable took the net returns to management enterprise figures calculated annually by the 
KFMA for the four main Kansas crops: wheat, corn, soybeans, and grain sorghum and multiplied 
them by the average crop mixes in each of the six KFMA regions (KFMA, 2016). This 
established six different regional net returns total for each year. This variable was then lagged 
one year to represent the knowledge available to a landowner or producer during the year in 
question; that is, the decision maker in this instance knows only what has happened recently and 
has no way of knowing the outcomes of the given season. This figure was deflated to 1998 levels 
in order to reflect the treatment given to the dependent variable of log of real price per acre. Also 
to mirror the dependent variable, this figure was entered logarithmically. However, in order to 
take the log of the variable, steps had to be taken to ensure that all observations were positive, so 
every observation was scaled up by 24 to ensure equality. 
 4.3 Data Summary 
The initial data set consisted of over 21,000 transactions over the 17 year period included 
in this analysis. Observations that did not include all necessary variables were eliminated as were 
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parcels less than 35 acres in size as these parcels represent potential non-agricultural 
acquisitions. The number of transactions with valid information for all included variables was 
9,444 over the 17 year period. Parcels of land that have a CRP contract present make up 6.5% of 
the total narrowed data set. The definitions and summary statistics of all variables included in the 
initial model can be found in Table 3.1.  
Table 4.4.1 Summary Statistics for Basic Hedonic Model 
Variable Definition Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Price Price per acre of parcel 1,029.28 927.25 50 26,000 
ln(Price) Natural log of price per acre 6.56 0.58 3.89 9.95 
Size Parcel size in acres 188.99 261.67 35 8,601 
Size2 Parcel size squared 104,182 1,405,497 1,225 74,000,000 
NICrop Percent of parcel in non-irrigated 
cropland 0.625 0.366 0 1 
IrrCrop Percent of parcel in irrigated 
cropland 0.053 0.202 0 1 
NetRet Real regional average of net returns 
to management/acre based on the 
previous year  
6.386 14.076 -23.80 58.45 
ln(NetRet) Natural log of net returns after 
scaling 3.296 0.573 -1.60 4.41 
Average Binary variable equal to 1 if parcel 
productivity rated as "average", 0 
otherwise 
0.174 0.379 0 1 
Good Binary variable equal to 1 if parcel 
productivity rated as "good", 0 
otherwise 
0.694 0.461 0 1 
Low Binary variable equal to 1 if parcel 
productivity rated as "low", 0 
otherwise 
0.132 0.339 0 1 
Dirt Binary variable equal to 1 if road 
access is dirt, 0 otherwise 0.213 0.409 0 1 
Gravel Binary variable equal to 1 if road 
access is gravel, 0 otherwise 0.740 0.439 0 1 
Hard Binary variable equal to 1 if road 
access is hard, 0 otherwise 0.047 0.212 0 1 
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Auction Binary variable equal to 1 if parcel 
sold at public auction, 0 otherwise 0.230 0.421 0 1 
Private Sale Binary variable equal to 1 if parcel 
sold privately, 0 otherwise 0.019 0.138 0 1 
CRP Binary variable equal to 1 if parcel 
has current CRP contract, 0 
otherwise 
0.065 0.247 0 1 
CRP_Y1998 Interaction term between CRP and 
Y1998 0.005 0.070 0 1 
CRP_Y1999 Interaction term between CRP and 
Y1999 0.005 0.073 0 1 
CRP_Y2000 Interaction term between CRP and 
Y2000 0.006 0.078 0 1 
CRP_Y2001 Interaction term between CRP and 
Y2001 0.006 0.079 0 1 
CRP_Y2002 Interaction term between CRP and 
Y2002 0.006 0.075 0 1 
CRP_Y2003 Interaction term between CRP and 
Y2003 0.007 0.082 0 1 
CRP_Y2004 Interaction term between CRP and 
Y2004 0.005 0.068 0 1 
CRP_Y2005 Interaction term between CRP and 
Y2005 0.005 0.069 0 1 
CRP_Y2006 Interaction term between CRP and 
Y2006 0.005 0.071 0 1 
CRP_Y2007 Interaction term between CRP and 
Y2007 0.004 0.062 0 1 
CRP_Y2008 Interaction term between CRP and 
Y2008 0.003 0.052 0 1 
CRP_Y2009 Interaction term between CRP and 
Y2009 0.002 0.046 0 1 
CRP_Y2010 Interaction term between CRP and 
Y2010 0.002 0.049 0 1 
CRP_Y2011 Interaction term between CRP and 
Y2011 0.002 0.042 0 1 
CRP_Y2012 Interaction term between CRP and 
Y2012 0.001 0.037 0 1 
CRP_Y2013 Interaction term between CRP and 
Y2013 0.001 0.029 0 1 
CRP_Y2014 Interaction term between CRP and 
Y2014 0.001 0.023 0 1 
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CRP_KFMA1 Interaction term between CRP and 
the Northwest KFMA region 0.013 0.115 0 1 
CRP_KFMA2 Interaction term between CRP and 
the North Central KFMA region 0.018 0.135 0 1 
CRP_KFMA3 Interaction term between CRP and 
the Northeast KFMA region 0.002 0.044 0 1 
CRP_KFMA4 Interaction term between CRP and 
the Southwest KFMA region 0.008 0.090 0 1 
CRP_KFMA5 Interaction term between CRP and 
the South Central KFMA region 0.022 0.147 0 1 
CRP_KFMA6 Interaction term between CRP and 
the Southeast KFMA region 0.001 0.035 0 1 
Q1 Binary variable equal to 1 if parcel 
sold in first quarter, 0 otherwise 0.315 0.465 0 1 
Q2 Binary variable equal to 1 if parcel 
sold in second quarter, 0 otherwise 0.295 0.456 0 1 
Q3 Binary variable equal to 1 if parcel 
sold in third quarter, 0 otherwise 0.184 0.388 0 1 
Q4 Binary variable equal to 1 if parcel 
sold in fourth quarter, 0 otherwise 0.206 0.404 0 1 
Y1998 Binary variable equal to 1 if parcel 
sold in 1998, 0 otherwise 0.118 0.323 0 1 
Y1999 Binary variable equal to 1 if parcel 
sold in 1999, 0 otherwise 0.093 0.290 0 1 
Y2000 Binary variable equal to 1 if parcel 
sold in 2000, 0 otherwise 0.087 0.281 0 1 
Y2001 Binary variable equal to 1 if parcel 
sold in 2001, 0 otherwise 0.092 0.289 0 1 
Y2002 Binary variable equal to 1 if parcel 
sold in 2005, 0 otherwise 0.085 0.279 0 1 
Y2003 Binary variable equal to 1 if parcel 
sold in 2005, 0 otherwise 0.083 0.277 0 1 
Y2004 Binary variable equal to 1 if parcel 
sold in 2005, 0 otherwise 0.069 0.254 0 1 
Y2005 Binary variable equal to 1 if parcel 
sold in 2005, 0 otherwise 0.060 0.238 0 1 
Y2006 Binary variable equal to 1 if parcel 
sold in 2006, 0 otherwise 0.062 0.240 0 1 
Y2007 Binary variable equal to 1 if parcel 
sold in 2007, 0 otherwise 0.050 0.218 0 1 
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Y2008 Binary variable equal to 1 if parcel 
sold in 2008, 0 otherwise 0.042 0.201 0 1 
Y2009 Binary variable equal to 1 if parcel 
sold in 2009, 0 otherwise 0.025 0.156 0 1 
Y2010 Binary variable equal to 1 if parcel 
sold in 2010, 0 otherwise 0.042 0.200 0 1 
Y2011 Binary variable equal to 1 if parcel 
sold in 2011, 0 otherwise 0.034 0.180 0 1 
Y2012 Binary variable equal to 1 if parcel 
sold in 2012, 0 otherwise 0.023 0.151 0 1 
Y2013 Binary variable equal to 1 if parcel 
sold in 2013, 0 otherwise 0.021 0.145 0 1 
Y2014 Binary variable equal to 1 if parcel 
sold in 2014, 0 otherwise 0.015 0.121 0 1 
County1 - 
County104 
Binary variables denoting parcel 
location in one of 104 Kansas 
Counties 
0.010 0.080 0 1 
Number of Observations = 9,603     
 
 The coefficient on 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 is expected to be negative, while the quadratic term is expected 
to be positive. This expectation is based on the fact that the bigger parcels of land tend to attract 
fewer potential buyers. This could be due to constraints regarding financing or potential non-
agricultural development opportunities afforded by smaller parcels. Fewer bidders is likely to 
result in lower bid prices for large tracts of land. 
The percentage of non-irrigated cropland (𝑁𝐼𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑖) should increase the price of a parcel 
when compared to pasture percentage, which is excluded and accounted for in the intercept. 
Pasture land is the least profitable land type as compared to farm land in Kansas. Irrigated land 
allows for higher and more consistent productivity when compared to typical cropland and is 
therefore more valuable. Therefore, the percentage of irrigated cropland (𝐼𝑟𝑟𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑖) will have a 
positive coefficient greater in magnitude than 𝑁𝐼𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑖. 
Net returns is included in the model as a logarithmic variable [ln(𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑡)]. This variable 
should have a positive coefficient as the higher net returns were the year before, it stands to 
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reason that more money can be spent on land in the given year. That is, as more money is in the 
hands of producers, there should be more competition for land parcels and therefore higher 
bidding on available land. 
 Land that assessors qualify as good should be valued higher than that which qualified as 
average. Average quality land will in turn be worth more than low quality land. Additionally, 
accessibility in terms of road type will effect value as well, with hard paved roads allowing for 
easiest access and therefore being the most valuable. Gravel roads will be worth less than hard 
paved, but should be worth more than dirt roads, which are the most difficult to traverse. The 
method with which the parcel will be marketed will also have an effect on price. Previous 
literature has shown that land sold at auction will sell at a higher price than land sold privately 
(Wilson, et. al. 2014).  
Fixed effect variables for year, quarter, and county are included in an effort to control for 
any variations in sale price that has not already been directly controlled for. County and quarter 
factors could include any number of variations including variation in state rainfall and weather 
patterns, access to urban areas, and the marketing patterns of regional crop producers. Year fixed 
effects should capture any macroeconomic differences between years including, but not limited 
to interest rates, expectations regarding farm policy, and shifts in international trade. 
Also included in the data set is additional information regarding the of CRP contracts for 
a subset of parcels. This information was not consistently provided for all parcels with CRP 
contracts and, therefore, could not be used to create additional variables for the empirical model. 
Of the 9,444 included transactions full data regarding CRP acreage, rate, and expiration year was 
available on only 153 transactions. However, a brief summary of that additional information 
reveals some insights into the nature of the contracts observed in the dataset. The average 
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number of acres under CRP contract is 83 acres. This can be compared to the average parcel size 
overall which is 190 acres. The average time left on a contract at the time of the sale is 4.5 years 
and the average rate being paid on the contract is $41.48. While these numbers are limited and 
do vary widely, it is plain to see that at the time of transaction, there is a high potential for 
several remaining years of reduced flexibility for the land buyer. 
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Chapter 5 - Results 
Results of the hedonic model are presented in table 5.1. The dependent variable is the 
natural logarithm of price per acre. Price per acre was transformed because the distribution of per 
acre sales was skewed by a relatively small number of high valued parcels. The use of a semi-
logarithmic regression requires using Kennedy’s (1981) adjustment be made to all binary 
variables to correct for bias. The equation for the Kennedy adjustment is as follows: 
( 6 )  𝑔 = exp (?̂? − 0.5?̂?(?̂?)) − 1 
where ?̂? is the unadjusted coefficient resulting from the regression, and ?̂? is that coefficient’s 
variance. The transformed coefficients are presented in table 5.1 for all binary variables. 
The physical land characteristics included in the model were statistically significant and 
had an expected sign. Parcel size has a negative impact on sale price, but this impact diminishes 
as parcel size increases due to the positive sign for the quadratic parcel size variable. Non-
irrigated cropland and irrigated cropland are worth more, on average, than pasture by 36.9% and 
102.1%, respectively. As compared to poor quality land, average quality land is worth 18.2% 
more and land rated as being of good quality averages 34.2% higher value. The type of access 
road also affects land prices with dirt road access being worth 11.4% less than paved road access 
and gravel road access being worth 6.9% less. Land marketed through a public auction sells for 
2.2% more than land marketed through other means. 
The only variable that returned an unexpected sign is that of lagged net returns. As 
mentioned previously, this variable was meant to account for the financial situation of 
agricultural producers at the time of the land transaction in question. This was the amount of 
money per acre the enterprise had returned to management the year before. It was thought that 
this variable would lead to a positive coefficient; that having made more money last year would 
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cause those in pursuit of land to have to pay more. Although the net returns coefficient was 
negative, it has a p-value of 11%, which is greater than the typical 90% and 95% confidence 
intervals. Therefore, although the estimated coefficient is positive, it is not a precise estimate. It 
is possible that alternative measurements of land buyer’s expectations of net farm incomes would 
yield different empirical results. 
Table 5.1 Hedonic Model Regression Results 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error P-Value 
Transformed 
Coefficient 
Size -2.69E-04 2.570E-05 0.000 -- 
Size2 3.21E-08 4.540E-09 0.000 -- 
Crop 0.369 0.011 0.000 -- 
IrrCrop 1.021 0.019 0.000 -- 
ln(Net Returns) -0.015 0.009 0.119 -- 
Average 0.182 0.016 0.000 0.199 
Good 0.342 0.018 0.000 0.408 
Dirt -0.114 0.013 0.000 -0.108 
Gravel -0.069 0.009 0.000 -0.066 
Auction 0.022 0.008 0.008 0.023 
CRP -0.106 0.055 0.053 -0.102 
CRP_Y1999 -0.047 0.067 0.482 -0.048 
CRP_Y2000 -0.006 0.066 0.930 -0.008 
CRP_Y2001 0.070 0.066 0.288 0.070 
CRP_Y2002 0.036 0.067 0.590 0.035 
CRP_Y2003 0.092 0.064 0.154 0.094 
CRP_Y2004 0.088 0.070 0.210 0.089 
CRP_Y2005 0.095 0.071 0.180 0.097 
CRP_Y2006 0.196 0.071 0.006 0.213 
CRP_Y2007 0.148 0.074 0.046 0.156 
CRP_Y2008 0.303 0.082 0.000 0.349 
CRP_Y2009 0.133 0.090 0.140 0.137 
CRP_Y2010 0.118 0.085 0.168 0.121 
CRP_Y2011 0.177 0.093 0.058 0.188 
CRP_Y2012 0.028 0.103 0.789 0.023 
CRP_Y2013 0.011 0.125 0.928 0.004 
CRP_Y2014 0.054 0.152 0.721 0.044 
CRP_KFMA2 -0.018 0.040 0.659 -0.018 
CRP_KFMA3 -0.262 0.092 0.004 -0.234 
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CRP_KFMA4 -0.053 0.050 0.290 -0.052 
CRP_KFMA5 -0.067 0.040 0.090 -0.066 
CRP_KFMA6 -0.117 0.102 0.253 -0.115 
Q2 0.010 0.008 0.238 0.010 
Q3 0.030 0.010 0.002 0.030 
Q4 0.051 0.009 0.000 0.053 
Y1999 -0.027 0.016 0.093 -0.026 
Y2000 0.014 0.016 0.381 0.014 
Y2001 -0.007 0.016 0.669 -0.007 
Y2002 0.032 0.017 0.055 0.032 
Y2003 0.042 0.020 0.032 0.043 
Y2004 0.105 0.017 0.000 0.111 
Y2005 0.192 0.018 0.000 0.211 
Y2006 0.208 0.020 0.000 0.231 
Y2007 0.242 0.020 0.000 0.274 
Y2008 0.386 0.020 0.000 0.471 
Y2009 0.472 0.024 0.000 0.603 
Y2010 0.528 0.020 0.000 0.695 
Y2011 0.570 0.022 0.000 0.767 
Y2012 0.844 0.024 0.000 1.325 
Y2013 1.022 0.026 0.000 1.778 
Y2014 1.110 0.029 0.000 2.034 
Constant 6.007 0.314 0.000 -- 
R2 0.718    
Adjusted R2 0.714    
Notes: County-level binary variables are included in the model, but are not listed here 
due to space constraints. 
 
The results also indicate that in the base year of this analysis, 1998, parcels with a CRP 
contract located in the Northwest KFMA region were worth 10.6% less than those without a 
CRP contract and located in the same region. For the remaining years in the sample, the impact 
of CRP on land value in each region is the calculated by adding the coefficient from CRP to the  
annual dummy variable interaction terms as well as the regional interaction terms. In 1999, for 
example, the impact on land value in the Northeast region is -39.5% (-10.6% + -2.7% + -26.2%) 
when a CRP contract is present. The total impact varies greatly over time and region. As shown 
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from the results of the regional interaction terms, the region most likely to have a negative CRP 
value is the Northeast region whose discount begins at an extra 26.2% compared to the base 
Northwest region. In fact, all regions have a discount when compared to the Northwest region, 
meaning the Northwest region represents the region with the lowest opportunity cost for CRP 
contracts. Based on the geography and production tendencies of Northwest Kansas, this result is 
very logical. It is important to note that the regions that tend to be considered the most 
agriculturally productive, Northeast and Southeast Kansas, have the highest initial discount when 
compared to the Northwest region. The rest of this analysis will focus on Northwest and 
Northeast Kansas in an effort to highlight the extremes, but results for all regions can be found in 
Appendix A. 
Figure 5.1 shows how the presence of a CRP contract affects land values over time in 
Northwest Kansas. The plotted values are the total effect and the linear bands represent the 90% 
confidence intervals for the total effect. The years that are different from zero at a 90% 
confidence interval are indicated in figure 5.1 with a green circle. Red squares denote total 
effects from CRP that are not different from zero at a p-value of 10% or better. The numerical 
values depicted in Figure 5.1 are also presented in Table 5.2. 
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Figure 5.1 Linear Combinations of CRP Coefficient and Interaction Terms, Northwest KS  
 
Table 5.2 Total Effect of CRP on Land Value by Year, Northwest Kansas 
Year Coefficient 
Standard 
Error P-Value 90% Confidence Interval 
1998 -0.1064 0.0550 0.053 -0.1969 -0.0159 
1999 -0.1537 0.0521 0.003 -0.2394 -0.0680 
2000 -0.1122 0.0497 0.024 -0.1939 -0.0305 
2001 -0.0365 0.0503 0.468 -0.1194 0.0463 
2002 -0.0702 0.0509 0.168 -0.1539 0.0135 
2003 -0.0146 0.0475 0.759 -0.0927 0.0635 
2004 -0.0187 0.0551 0.734 -0.1093 0.0718 
2005 -0.0116 0.0595 0.845 -0.1096 0.0863 
2006 0.0894 0.0590 0.130 -0.0076 0.1863 
2007 0.0416 0.0619 0.502 -0.0603 0.1434 
2008 0.1962 0.0719 0.006 0.0779 0.3144 
2009 0.0265 0.0813 0.745 -0.1072 0.1602 
2010 0.0115 0.0761 0.880 -0.1137 0.1367 
2011 0.0706 0.0864 0.414 -0.0715 0.2127 
2012 -0.0788 0.0964 0.414 -0.2374 0.0798 
2013 -0.0951 0.1196 0.427 -0.2918 0.1017 
2014 -0.0519 0.1483 0.726 -0.2958 0.1920 
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As figure 5.1 and table 5.2 show, the discount for CRP was relatively large in the first 
three years (1998 – 2000), there was a statistically significant and relatively large discount on 
parcels of land with CRP contracts. However, the discount became smaller during the years 2001 
through 2011, becoming positive in 2006 with a statistically significant premium on contract 
parcels in 2008. During the last three years of the observation period, the impact of CRP 
contracts on land values returned to being negative. This variation in the impact of CRP contracts 
on land value likely reflects changes in the opportunity cost of setting aside land in CRP even in 
the region with the lowest initial opportunity cost for CRP contracts. 
The Northeast region which tends to produce high value crops such as corn and soybeans 
is more obviously effected by shifting opportunity costs in CRP. Figure 5.2 shows the linear 
combinations of CRP, year interaction terms, and regional interaction terms in Northeast Kansas. 
Again, the plotted values are the total effect and the linear bands represent the 90% confidence 
intervals for the total effect. The years that are different from zero at a 90% confidence interval 
are indicated in figure 5.2 with a green circle. Red squares denote total effects from CRP that are 
not different from zero at a p-value of 10% or better. The numerical values depicted in Figure 5.2 
are also presented in Table 5.3. 
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Figure 5.2 Linear Combinations of CRP Coefficient and Interaction Terms, Northeast KS 
 
Table 5.3 Total Effect of CRP on Land Value by Year, Northeast Kansas 
Year Coefficient 
Standard 
Error P-Value 90% Confidence Interval 
1998 -0.3686 0.0955 0.000 -0.5257 -0.2115 
1999 -0.4159 0.0982 0.000 -0.5774 -0.2544 
2000 -0.3744 0.0979 0.000 -0.5353 -0.2134 
2001 -0.2987 0.0972 0.002 -0.4586 -0.1389 
2002 -0.3324 0.0982 0.001 -0.4939 -0.1709 
2003 -0.2768 0.0966 0.004 -0.4356 -0.1179 
2004 -0.2809 0.1000 0.005 -0.4454 -0.1165 
2005 -0.2738 0.0987 0.006 -0.4362 -0.1115 
2006 -0.1728 0.1003 0.085 -0.3379 -0.0078 
2007 -0.2206 0.1029 0.032 -0.3898 -0.0514 
2008 -0.0660 0.1078 0.540 -0.2434 0.1114 
2009 -0.2357 0.1118 0.035 -0.4196 -0.0518 
2010 -0.2507 0.0952 0.008 -0.4073 -0.0941 
2011 -0.1916 0.1101 0.082 -0.3728 -0.0105 
2012 -0.3410 0.1171 0.004 -0.5336 -0.1484 
2013 -0.3573 0.1365 0.009 -0.5818 -0.1327 
2014 -0.3141 0.1593 0.049 -0.5763 -0.0520 
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 The stark differences in how CRP contracts are valued in the Northwest and Northeast 
KFMA regions highlight the importance of the inclusion of regional interaction terms. In 
Northwest Kansas the maximum discount a parcel of land on which a CRP contract was present 
accrued over the course of this analysis was just over 15%. In Northeast Kansas, that maximum 
discount jumps to over 41%. Obviously, the opportunity cost of enrolling in a CRP contract in 
each region differs drastically based on the regional characteristics of land and the production 
methods employed in each region. 
The challenge to interpreting the results is being able to determine what was driving the 
change in the relative value of CRP rents versus cash rents from farming. During this first nine 
years of the study period (1998 to 2007), net farm incomes were low. The question that remains 
is, why is the discount on CRP parcels during these first nine years large in magnitude for the 
years 1998, 1999, and 2000, but smaller in magnitude for the remain years or 2001 to 2007? 
Even in Northwest Kansas where CRP was shown to have less negative effects on land value 
than other regions, 1998, 1999, and 2000 had statistically significant negative coefficients for 
CRP land. To answer this question, it is useful to look at  average CRP rates in Kansas. The 
annual rents for Northwest Kansas are presented in figure 5.3 for the years 1995 to 2014. As is 
evident, 1998 marks the first year of a significant decline in the rental rates paid for CRP 
contracts from a regional average of $57.08 per acre in 1997 to an average of $49.17, $47.46, 
and $45.13 per acre for 1998, 1999, and 2000, respectively. After 2000, the average value 
stabilizes at approximately $45 per acre and begins to climb again over the length of the time 
period. The drastic change in the average rent paid on CRP contracts is a result of the expiration 
of the initial round of CRP contracts signed. When first established, the Conservation Reserve 
Program sought to enroll 45 million acres between 1985 and 1990. The 10 to 15 year contracts 
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would have expired in the early window of figure 5.3. At the same time, the Federal Agriculture 
Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996 capped CRP enrollment at 36.4 million acres and 
allowed land deemed less environmentally sensitive that had been enrolled in CRP for at least 
five years the chance to exit the program if notice was given (Agricultural Outlook Supplement, 
1996). This led to an exodus from the program of original adoptees as well as heightened 
competition for those looking to enroll in the program. These factors created a situation where 
the average CRP rental rate did not have to be as high as in previous years to meet program 
goals. Returning to the results of this study, it is possible the large decline in rental rates paid on 
CRP contracts affected the opportunity cost calculation being made by landowners and people 
looking to buy parcels with acres under CRP contract.  That is, landowners and those seeking to 
purchase land perceived the opportunity cost of CRP was now higher due to the significantly 
reduced rental payments. Similar trends regarding the large discounts in the first few years of this 
analysis can be found in all six KFMA regions (See Appendix A).  
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Figure 5.3 Average CRP Rental Rate in Northwest Kansas, 1995-2014 
 
Source: USDA - FSA 
 While the above discussion tackles the question of the early trend of CRP discounts, as 
figures 5.1 and 5.2 show, the level has changed greatly over the given time period. After the 
initial discount, as landowners and buyers became accustomed to the lower CRP rates, the 
discount lessened in magnitude and was even positive in for varying periods of time in five of 
the six KFMA regions.  
This is important because it lends support to the validity of the analysis. An alternative 
interpretation of the model results would be that parcels of land with CRP contracts are 
discounted because of the quality of the land rather than strictly the opportunity cost of 
alternative uses. It is likely that land enrolled in CRP will be land that is of lower quality due to 
highly erodible soils. The empirical model was specified to account for this confounding effect 
by including the relative ranking of land quality by professional appraisers that was included in 
the dataset. If the CRP discount was always negative, it would be more difficult to argue that 
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land quality was sufficiently accounted for in the model to arrive at a precise estimate of the CRP 
effect alone. 
Toward the end of the time period, the discount again starts to increase as shown in 
figures 5.1 and 5.2. The driver of this change in the magnitude of the discount is likely from the 
relative profitability of farming. As discussed in Chapter 4, both net incomes and net returns 
were high, however it is hard to say how much of a direct effect this fact had on CRP. We can 
assume because of the large opportunity cost for CRP contracts that exists over the life of the 
analysis in Northeast Kansas, these times of increased profitability contributed more to this 
negative swing than in other regions. So, in order to explain the downward trend in Northwest 
Kansas where CRP land has historically brought premiums, it is helpful to reexamine figure 3.2, 
which compares the rent-to-value ratios of land in CRP versus land that is farmed. The drop in 
CRP rates discussed above and illustrated in figure 5.3 can be seen in figure 3.2 when the CRP 
rent to value ration drops by nearly 2% between 1997 and 1998. After that drastic drop, the two 
stayed roughly the same distance apart from 1999-2008. However, in 2010 the ratios begin to 
converge. CRP is no longer the obvious preferential investment that it once was. While it still 
represents the better option on average, farming becomes more and more feasible as a means to 
make a profit. This trend continues through the remainder of the analysis time period. It is this 
increase in opportunity cost for enrolling in a CRP contract relative to farming the land that 
drives the large negative coefficients found in 2012, 2013 and 2014 across all six KFMA 
regions.  
Finally, in an effort to illustrate that the opportunity cost of CRP enrollment is higher in 
some regions than in others, figure 5.4 shows total CRP enrollment in Kansas by region. As is 
obvious, those regions that incur the most significant discounts historically from CRP (Northeast 
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and Southeast) have the lowest enrollment. However, those regions that are less affected by these 
opportunity cost shifts and whose CRP and cash rent to value ratios never converge (Northwest 
and Southwest) enroll in droves. 
Figure 5.4 Average CRP Enrollment in Kansas by Region 
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Chapter 6 - Conclusion  
 6.1 Empirical Findings 
This paper set out to empirically test whether or not the presence of a CRP contract on a 
parcel of land affects its value. In previous literature, only negative effects had been found due to 
the relatively short periods of time considered. Also crucial was the inclusion of interaction 
terms allowing the effect of CRP on land values to vary over time. As has been demonstrated, 
CRP contracts can indeed affect land value both positively and negatively, depending on the 
profitability of farming and the expectations of how those profits will change over time by 
landowners. 
When choosing to enroll in the Conservation Reserve Program, a landowner is well 
aware that they are choosing to forego any potential profits that the parcel might have made from 
being actively farmed for a constant stream of payments from the federal government. This can 
be a blessing or a curse depending on what happens to the market. Their assessment of the 
opportunity cost of enrolling is based solely on the information available to them at the time of 
enrollment. The point is that a landowner cannot be expected to know how the opportunity cost 
of enrolling in the program will change over such a great length of time. Therefore, this analysis 
shows that the changes in opportunity cost over the length of the contract are instead reflected in 
the changes in value of Conservation Reserve Program land.  
 6.2 Policy Implications 
The current CRP rental payment system establishes one payment rate over the length of 
the 10 to 15 year contract. The amount of this payment is agreed to by a landowner who, at the 
time of enrollment, possesses imperfect information regarding the how the opportunity cost that 
38 
 
is being undertaken might shift over the length of the contract. Certainly this system of constant 
payments saves on administrative and oversight costs for the Farm Service Agency. However, 
based on this analysis, it becomes clear that a few simple changes could be made in order to 
position the Conservation Reserve Program as a more attractive investment for landowners. This 
would allow for more consistent and competitive enrollment in the program and continue to meet 
and improve upon the laudable environmental goals set out by the program. 
The Farm Service Agency could establish a payment system that takes into account 
market factors such as net incomes and rent to value ratios and adjust CRP payments up or down 
depending on the situation at hand. A payment structure that uses price indices to either raise or 
lower payments according to how prices have changed over the length of the contract is another 
tenable option. If these payments were to change based on returns, it is plausible to assume that 
landowners would be more likely to enroll because the perceived opportunity costs have been 
offset. Since its implementation, the cap on CRP acreage has been reduced by roughly 20 million 
acres. If this program were ever to expand again, taking this step would help with enrollment 
goals. However, even if the cap were to remain near its current level, having a system in which 
more landowners feel empowered to enroll could make bids more competitive. Having more 
bidders would allow the FSA and the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) to pull 
the most environmentally sensitive land out of production, thus increasing the environmental 
benefits of the program at large. This shift in policy is not simply a one way street economically. 
New contracts could allow for the decrease in payments in times of low returns as well, saving 
the government money in certain fiscal environments. It is the elimination of the opportunity 
costs afforded by this policy shift that make it such a viable option. 
39 
 
Still other solutions include allowing for opt-outs if a producer decides that farming the 
land is the more economically viable option. As stated previously, the FAIR Act of 1996 allowed 
for such opt-outs, as did the 2014 Farm Bill. However, these opt-out periods are short and 
unscheduled. They can come around at any time and producers must make a snap decision about 
remaining in the program. Placing a five year opt-out option in new contracts would be a simple 
and effective way of increasing interest in the Conservation Reserve Program. 
 6.3 Future Research 
There are many potential avenues for future research that could expand our understanding 
of the impact of CRP on land values. First and foremost, the inclusion of flexibility data would 
be very helpful. As stated previously, there is some data regarding the number of acres enrolled 
in CRP of a parcel, the rate at which a parcel is enrolled, as well as the expiration date of the 
contract in question at the time of the sale. However, these data are variable and there was not 
enough of it to include in this paper. Ideally, there would be a way to include these numbers as a 
measure of flexibility. That is, how much flexibility did the new buyer have when purchasing the 
land? Did the CRP contract encompass a small or large percentage of the parcel? Was the 
contract set to expire the next year or ten years from the time of purchase? Measuring how much 
flexibility each sold parcel possessed would allow for an even more interesting discussion of 
how CRP contracts inform land purchasing decisions. 
Another measure that would expand this analysis is the value landowners derive from the 
environmental benefits the Conservation Reserve Program brings about. Because this paper 
represents a purely quantitative analysis, it fails to consider the utility that might well be derived 
from some landowners who enroll in CRP simply because they feel the environmental benefits 
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are so important. The best way to quantify this might well be a survey. However, even without 
this data, the economic viewpoints established in the above research are sound.  
The analysis could reveal more information on changes in opportunity costs by 
expanding the dataset back further to at or before 1995. This would allow for the observation of 
how the higher CRP rental rates that were in place from the program’s inception in 1985 until 
1998 affected the value of the CRP coefficients during that time period. Were the coefficients 
already negative, or did the significant drop in rental rates shown in figure 5.2 cause the extreme 
negativity observed in 1998 and 1999? Also, the period of 1995-1997 represents yet another 
instance of high net returns and farm incomes. Including these dates would allow for the 
observation of yet another cycle of prices from extraordinary to ordinary within the context of 
this analysis. Indeed, this would be the step most recommended to any who choose to continue 
this research.  
Finally, this work could be repeated in other states to determine if the established trend is 
nationwide. As mentioned in the literature review, hedonic models have previously been used to 
consider CRP contracts in both Minnesota and North Dakota. Indeed, Schmitz and Shultz 
encouraged similar work be done in other states. Those states that possess the resources to 
accurately track land sales that are under CRP contract should do so in an effort to establish a 
reliable and understandable trend that future policy decisions can be based upon without 
hesitation. 
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Appendix A - Results for All Kansas Regions 
Northwest Kansas 
Rent-to-Value Ratio 
 
Linear Combinations of CRP Coefficient and Interaction Terms 
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Total Effect of CRP on Land Value by Year 
Year Coefficient 
Standard 
Error P-Value 90% Confidence Interval 
1998 -0.1064 0.0550 0.053 -0.1969 -0.0159 
1999 -0.1537 0.0521 0.003 -0.2394 -0.0680 
2000 -0.1122 0.0497 0.024 -0.1939 -0.0305 
2001 -0.0365 0.0503 0.468 -0.1194 0.0463 
2002 -0.0702 0.0509 0.168 -0.1539 0.0135 
2003 -0.0146 0.0475 0.759 -0.0927 0.0635 
2004 -0.0187 0.0551 0.734 -0.1093 0.0718 
2005 -0.0116 0.0595 0.845 -0.1096 0.0863 
2006 0.0894 0.0590 0.130 -0.0076 0.1863 
2007 0.0416 0.0619 0.502 -0.0603 0.1434 
2008 0.1962 0.0719 0.006 0.0779 0.3144 
2009 0.0265 0.0813 0.745 -0.1072 0.1602 
2010 0.0115 0.0761 0.880 -0.1137 0.1367 
2011 0.0706 0.0864 0.414 -0.0715 0.2127 
2012 -0.0788 0.0964 0.414 -0.2374 0.0798 
2013 -0.0951 0.1196 0.427 -0.2918 0.1017 
2014 -0.0519 0.1483 0.726 -0.2958 0.1920 
 
North Central Kansas 
Rent-to-Value Ratio 
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Linear Combinations of CRP Coefficient and Interaction Terms 
 
Total Effect of CRP on Land Value by Year 
Year Coefficient 
Standard 
Error P-Value 90% Confidence Interval 
1998 -0.1240 0.0557 0.026 -0.2156 -0.0324 
1999 -0.1713 0.0493 0.001 -0.2524 -0.0902 
2000 -0.1298 0.0484 0.007 -0.2094 -0.0501 
2001 -0.0541 0.0482 0.262 -0.1334 0.0252 
2002 -0.0878 0.0487 0.072 -0.1679 -0.0076 
2003 -0.0321 0.0465 0.489 -0.1086 0.0443 
2004 -0.0363 0.0547 0.507 -0.1263 0.0537 
2005 -0.0292 0.0552 0.597 -0.1201 0.0616 
2006 0.0718 0.0515 0.164 -0.0130 0.1566 
2007 0.0240 0.0588 0.683 -0.0727 0.1207 
2008 0.1786 0.0663 0.007 0.0695 0.2876 
2009 0.0089 0.0780 0.909 -0.1194 0.1372 
2010 -0.0061 0.0725 0.933 -0.1254 0.1133 
2011 0.0530 0.0824 0.520 -0.0826 0.1886 
2012 -0.0964 0.0942 0.306 -0.2513 0.0586 
2013 -0.1126 0.1181 0.340 -0.3069 0.0816 
2014 -0.0695 0.1461 0.634 -0.3098 0.1708 
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Northeast Kansas 
Rent-to-Value Ratios 
 
Linear Combinations of CRP Coefficient and Interaction Terms 
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Total Effect of CRP on Land Value by Year 
Year Coefficient 
Standard 
Error P-Value 90% Confidence Interval 
1998 -0.3686 0.0955 0.000 -0.5257 -0.2115 
1999 -0.4159 0.0982 0.000 -0.5774 -0.2544 
2000 -0.3744 0.0979 0.000 -0.5353 -0.2134 
2001 -0.2987 0.0972 0.002 -0.4586 -0.1389 
2002 -0.3324 0.0982 0.001 -0.4939 -0.1709 
2003 -0.2768 0.0966 0.004 -0.4356 -0.1179 
2004 -0.2809 0.1000 0.005 -0.4454 -0.1165 
2005 -0.2738 0.0987 0.006 -0.4362 -0.1115 
2006 -0.1728 0.1003 0.085 -0.3379 -0.0078 
2007 -0.2206 0.1029 0.032 -0.3898 -0.0514 
2008 -0.0660 0.1078 0.540 -0.2434 0.1114 
2009 -0.2357 0.1118 0.035 -0.4196 -0.0518 
2010 -0.2507 0.0952 0.008 -0.4073 -0.0941 
2011 -0.1916 0.1101 0.082 -0.3728 -0.0105 
2012 -0.3410 0.1171 0.004 -0.5336 -0.1484 
2013 -0.3573 0.1365 0.009 -0.5818 -0.1327 
2014 -0.3141 0.1593 0.049 -0.5763 -0.0520 
 
Southwest Kansas 
Rent-to-Value Ratios 
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Linear Combinations of CRP Coefficient and Interaction Terms 
 
Total Effect of CRP on Land Value by Year 
Year Coefficient 
Standard 
Error P-Value 90% Confidence Interval 
1998 -0.1590 0.0645 0.014 -0.2651 -0.0529 
1999 -0.2063 0.0581 0.000 -0.3020 -0.1107 
2000 -0.1648 0.0559 0.003 -0.2568 -0.0728 
2001 -0.0892 0.0546 0.103 -0.1790 0.0007 
2002 -0.1228 0.0576 0.033 -0.2176 -0.0280 
2003 -0.0672 0.0549 0.221 -0.1576 0.0232 
2004 -0.0714 0.0606 0.239 -0.1711 0.0284 
2005 -0.0643 0.0598 0.283 -0.1627 0.0341 
2006 0.0367 0.0622 0.555 -0.0656 0.1390 
2007 -0.0111 0.0658 0.867 -0.1193 0.0972 
2008 0.1435 0.0755 0.057 0.0193 0.2678 
2009 -0.0261 0.0852 0.759 -0.1663 0.1140 
2010 -0.0411 0.0812 0.613 -0.1747 0.0925 
2011 0.0180 0.0898 0.841 -0.1297 0.1657 
2012 -0.1314 0.1001 0.189 -0.2961 0.0333 
2013 -0.1477 0.1221 0.226 -0.3485 0.0531 
2014 -0.1046 0.1503 0.487 -0.3518 0.1427 
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South Central Kansas 
Rent-to-Value Ratios 
 
Linear Combinations of CRP Coefficient and Interaction Terms 
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Total Effect of CRP on Land Value by Year 
Year Coefficient 
Standard 
Error P-Value 90% Confidence Interval 
1998 -0.1736 0.0538 0.001 -0.2622 -0.0851 
1999 -0.2209 0.0501 0.000 -0.3033 -0.1386 
2000 -0.1794 0.0497 0.000 -0.2611 -0.0977 
2001 -0.1038 0.0470 0.027 -0.1812 -0.0264 
2002 -0.1374 0.0504 0.006 -0.2203 -0.0545 
2003 -0.0818 0.0468 0.080 -0.1587 -0.0049 
2004 -0.0860 0.0521 0.099 -0.1716 -0.0003 
2005 -0.0789 0.0514 0.125 -0.1635 0.0057 
2006 0.0221 0.0537 0.680 -0.0663 0.1105 
2007 -0.0257 0.0575 0.655 -0.1202 0.0689 
2008 0.1289 0.0658 0.050 0.0207 0.2371 
2009 -0.0407 0.0774 0.598 -0.1680 0.0865 
2010 -0.0557 0.0742 0.453 -0.1778 0.0664 
2011 0.0034 0.0796 0.966 -0.1276 0.1343 
2012 -0.1460 0.0912 0.110 -0.2961 0.0041 
2013 -0.1623 0.1139 0.154 -0.3496 0.0250 
2014 -0.1192 0.1446 0.410 -0.3570 0.1187 
 
Southeast Kansas 
Rent-to-Value Ratios 
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Linear Combinations of CRP Coefficient and Interaction Terms 
 
Total Effect of CRP on Land Value by Year 
Year Coefficient 
Standard 
Error P-Value 90% Confidence Interval 
1998 -0.2235 0.1037 0.031 -0.3940 -0.0530 
1999 -0.2708 0.1070 0.011 -0.4468 -0.0948 
2000 -0.2293 0.1054 0.030 -0.4027 -0.0559 
2001 -0.1537 0.1063 0.148 -0.3285 0.0211 
2002 -0.1873 0.1085 0.084 -0.3658 -0.0088 
2003 -0.1317 0.1048 0.209 -0.3041 0.0407 
2004 -0.1359 0.1104 0.219 -0.3175 0.0458 
2005 -0.1288 0.1090 0.238 -0.3081 0.0506 
2006 -0.0278 0.1110 0.803 -0.2103 0.1548 
2007 -0.0756 0.1132 0.504 -0.2618 0.1106 
2008 0.0790 0.1181 0.503 -0.1153 0.2734 
2009 -0.0906 0.1203 0.451 -0.2885 0.1072 
2010 -0.1056 0.1215 0.385 -0.3054 0.0942 
2011 -0.0465 0.1270 0.714 -0.2555 0.1625 
2012 -0.1959 0.1345 0.145 -0.4172 0.0254 
2013 -0.2122 0.1515 0.161 -0.4614 0.0371 
2014 -0.1691 0.1750 0.334 -0.4569 0.1188 
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